REVIEW ARTICLES |
BCN, Neuroimaging Centre, University Medical Centre Groningen, The Netherlands
Department of Neuropsychiatry, St George's Hospital, London
Section of Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, Institute of Psychiatry, London, UK
Correspondence: André Aleman, BCN Neuroimaging Centre, Anton Deusinglaan 2, NL9713 AW, Groningen, The Netherlands. Tel: +31 503638798; email: a.aleman{at}med.umcg.nl
Funding detailed in Acknowledgement.
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Method A systematic review and meta-analysis were conducted after data extraction. Following an overall analysis, in which measures of different cognitive domains were taken together, more fine-grained analyses investigated whether there was a specific relation with frontal executive functioning, and whether this was influenced by diagnosis or the insight scales used.
Results There was a significant mean correlation between insight ratings and neurocognitive performance (mean weighted r=0.17, 95% CI 0.13-0.21, z=8.3, P<0.0001), based on 35 studies with a total of 2354 individuals. Further analyses revealed that the effect of general intellectual impairment was smaller than the specific association with executive function. This was only the case for psychosis in general, and not in an analysis limited to schizophrenia, where all cognitive domains were associated with impaired insight to a similar degree.
Conclusions Neuropsychological dysfunction, specifically impairment of set-shifting and error monitoring, contributes to poor insight in psychosis. Specific relations with different dimensions of insight and the putative role of metacognitive functions require further study.
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In this paper we present meta-analyses of insight and cognition studies, in order to synthesise and integrate the published findings, and to estimate the magnitude of any association. Furthermore, we test the hypothesis whether insight is related to general intellectual dysfunction (e.g. IQ score) or more specifically to prefrontal cognitive dysfunction (e.g. WCST performance). Separate analyses are conducted for samples with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (as opposed to other psychoses) because schizophrenia has been associated with substantial cognitive impairment (Heinrichs & Zakzaknis, 1998; Aleman et al, 1999). Finally, insight is a multidimensional construct, and measures of insight vary considerably, ranging from 1 to 74 items (Amador & Kronengold, 2004). Therefore, we address the issue whether different components of the insight construct and different measures thereof moderate the insight-cognition relationship.
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To be included in the meta-analysis, studies had to report correlations between insight scales and cognitive performance measures. In addition, they had to satisfy the following criteria:
Studies had to include a valid measure of insight, such as the insight item from the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay et al, 1987) or Present State Examination (PSE; Wing et al, 1974); the 11-item Schedule for the Assessment of Insight, original and Expanded version (SAI-E; Kemp & David, 1997; Sanz et al, 1998); the 74-item Scale to Assess Unawareness of Mental Disorder (SUMD; Amador et al, 1993); or the 11-item Insight and Treatment Attitudes Questionnaire (ITAQ; McEvoy et al, 1989).
With regard to the cognitive domains, we defined five domains. The first was total cognition, in which all cognitive test results published in the same paper were pooled. Examples of such tests are the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), or subtests of the WAIS such as Digit Span; the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE); the National Adult Reading Test (NART); the Trail Making Test; the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST); and measures of attention, memory tests and verbal fluency tests (see Lezak, 1995 for a description of these measures). The second domain was IQ only, which in most cases pertained to the WAIS. Other estimates of intelligence with an established validity were also included. In cases where only a number of WAIS sub-tests were included, these subtests were pooled. The third domain, memory, included established measures of verbal and visual memory performance (see Aleman et al, 1999). Fourth was frontal executive function, which included the Trail Making Test B, verbal fluency and the WCST. Finally, a separate analysis limited to the WCST was included, because several authors have postulated a specific relationship between perseveration as assessed by the WCST and poor insight (cf. Morgan & David, 2004). Furthermore, in a construct validation factor analysis (involving data from 473 clinical cases) WCST scores loaded independently of other neuropsychological variables, indicating that the WCST contributes uniquely to neuropsychological evaluation (Greve et al, 1998). For the WCST analysis we included categories completed as well as perseverative responses, which were pooled when both were reported in a single paper (cf. Nieuwenstein et al, 2001). These parameters of the WCST have been shown to load on the same factor, termed `perseveration' (Cuesta et al, 1995).
Data analysis
For each study an effect size was calculated, which was the mean r
weighted for sample size (Hunter &
Schmidt, 1990). When the precise r values were not given,
an estimate was computed from exact P, t or F values
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). A
problem in meta-analysis concerns the handling of missing values owing to
studies reporting that a result was non-significant without providing the
exact statistics. The most common method is to exclude such studies
completely; this is unfortunate, and will bias the results considerably when
there is a substantial number of studies with this problem (as in the present
case). Another method is to give such studies values of r=0, which is
a highly conservative approach that may obscure the existence of small
effects. A third method is to assign such studies the mean effect size of the
studies that report an insignificant effect size. A problem of this method is
that it may yield an overestimation of the non-significant effect sizes (as
authors will more readily report non-significant effect sizes of some
magnitude than very small ones). A reasonable compromise, in our view, is to
include the lowest value of the 95% confidence interval of the mean effect
size for non-significant studies that do report precise statistics. This is a
conservative approach, but not as extremely conservative as the zero
substitution approach. We adopted this strategy for the overall analysis, to
be able to include as many informative papers as possible. After computing
effect sizes for each study we applied meta-analytic methods in order to
obtain a combined effect size, which indicated the magnitude of the
association across all studies (cf.
Nieuwenstein et al,
2001). Effect sizes were weighted for sample size, in order to
correct for upwardly biased estimation of the effect in small sample sizes
(Rosenthal, 1991). The
corresponding z-value and significance level provide an indication of
the statistical significance of the association. We also calculated a
homogeneity statistic, Q, to test whether the studies can be taken to
share a common population effect size. A significant Q statistic
indicates heterogeneity of the individual study effect sizes which poses a
threat to a reliable interpretation of the results. However, when a small
number of studies are included in the meta-analysis, the Q statistic
can underreport heterogeneity, and an exploration of heterogeneity is
warranted through subgroup analyses. All analyses were carried out in the
random-effects model, using the Comprehensive Meta-Analysis package (see
http://www.meta-analysis.com).
In contrast to the fixed-effects model, the random-effects model permits
generalisation to studies not yet in the sample, and is to be preferred when
studying psychiatric phenomena which may be not only empirically but also
conceptually heterogeneous (Rosenthal
& DiMatteo, 2001).
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View this table: [in a new window] |
Table 1 Characteristics of studies included in the meta-analyses
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View this table: [in a new window] |
Table 2 Results of meta-analyses on insightcognition relationships in
samples of patients with (a) psychosis and (b) with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia
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View this table: [in a new window] |
Table 3 Different insight scales and mean correlations with neuropsychological
function across studies
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![]() View larger version (24K): [in a new window] [as a PowerPoint slide] |
Fig. 1 Forest plot of studies included in the meta-analysis of the relationship
between insight and `total cognition' (all cognitive tests pooled
together).
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Fig. 2 Forest plot of studies included in the meta-analysis of the relationship
between insight and IQ test performance.
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Fig. 3 Forest plot of studies included in the meta-analysis of the relationship
between insight and Winsconsin Card Sorting Test performance.
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The next analyses were confined to studies reporting on samples of patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia made using explicit diagnostic criteria. Mean effect sizes for insight-cognition relationships were in the small to medium range, and varied from 0.19 (executive function) to 0.28 (memory). The effect sizes did not differ significantly from each other. Thus, in contrast to the first analysis for psychosis in general, the WCST-insight relationship was not stronger than the IQ-insight relationship. In addition, the correlation between memory performance and insight was significant in this analysis limited to schizophrenia, but not in the first analysis including psychosis in general. Table 2 lists all results for these analyses.
Finally, associations of different insight scales with cognition were examined (including studies that reported on psychosis in general). These analyses focused on the four scales that have most been used (Morgan & David, 2004), all of which showed significant correlations with total cognition (Table 3). With regard to associations with general cognition, mean correlations varied from 0.15 (PANSS) to 0.28 (ITAQ). The differences in magnitude of effect size did not attain significance, however. For the WCST the mean correlation with the SUMD was 0.28, whereas the correlation with the SAI was 0.14. Again, however, this difference was not significant: QB=1.8, P=0.18.
Publication bias
A concern in the interpretation of meta-analytic findings is the
possibility of an upward bias of the mean effect due to the omission of
unpublished studies with null effects. Small studies with significant results
tend to be published, whereas small studies without statistically significant
findings tend to remain in the file drawer.
Figure 4 is a funnel plot of
the studies included in the primary analysis: this is a scatterplot of the
effect size by sample size of each study, which should take the shape of a
funnel, as there should be greater variability among the effect sizes based on
small samples than those based on large samples
(Wang & Bushman, 1998).
The underrepresentation of small studies with small effects could be
indicative of publication bias. Figure
4 shows that such studies are indeed somewhat underrepresented,
but the asymmetry is not strong. To assess whether sampling bias would be
large enough to render the mean effect size insignificant, we computed an
additional statistic, the fail-safe n
(Orwin, 1983;
Rosenthal, 1991).
Specifically, we determined the number of studies with an effect size of zero
needed to reduce the mean effect size to a negligible effect (r=0.05). The
fail-safe n was 84 for the overall analysis (35 studies) and 40 for
the analysis confined to the diagnosis of schizophrenia (11 studies). It is
unlikely that such a large number of unpublished studies with null effects
reside in file drawers.
![]() View larger version (8K): [in a new window] [as a PowerPoint slide] |
Fig. 4 Funnel plot of the studies included in the primary analysis: the effect
size r (x-axis) is plotted against the sample size
(y-axis) of each study (the vertical line indicates the mean weighted
effect size).
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Neuropsychological dysfunction
It has been a matter of debate in recent years whether poor insight in
psychotic disorders can, in part, be explained by neuropsychological
dysfunction. The association of insight with general cognitive function
observed in our meta-analysis may imply that the interpretation and
attribution of anomalous mental experiences is indeed hampered by poor general
cognition. Notably, although the effect sizes were in the small to medium
range, a recent meta-analysis meta-analysis of insight studies reported
comparable mean correlations for the association with positive and negative
symptoms; Mintz et al
(2003) observed a correlation
of 0.25 for positive symptoms (based on 22 studies) and a correlation of 0.23
for negative symptoms (based on 20 studies). Hence, it could be argued that
poor insight in psychosis is part and parcel of psychopathology and cognitive
dysfunction in roughly equal measure. However, although psychotic symptoms
have been suggested to be largely independent of cognitive functioning
(Nieuwenstein et al,
2001), any conclusion regarding independent contributions of
psychopathological disorder and cognitive deficits to impaired insight should
be confirmed by a regression model in the same sample. Furthermore,
interpretations of association should not assume causality. It is possible
that the assessment of insight is confounded by cognition, since a clinician's
tendency to infer insight may be coloured by the patient's ability to express
complex attitudes and experiences. Independent rating of insight and cognition
would minimise this effect.
The finding that in patients with a psychotic disorder the relationship between WCST performance and insight was significantly stronger than the association with IQ may imply a specific role of perseveration. With regard to the cognitive mechanisms of insight, WCST performance has been suggested to be of particular relevance (Drake & Lewis, 2003). Cognitive flexibility is important, as it refers to the capacity `to hold an abstract representation related to an actual situation, but different from it, at the same time as the more obvious immediate representation' (Drake & Lewis, 2003). This capacity would enable people to evaluate their own perceptions, thoughts and behaviour in relation to knowledge of symptoms of mental illness (shaped by social and cultural influences). In a sample of 33 people with acute psychosis, Drake & Lewis (2003) reported a specific strong correlation (r=0.59) between insight and perseverative errors, rather than more general measures of abstraction. This is consistent with the notion that a failure to change cognitive set and to monitor error responses may lead to impaired insight. It should be kept in mind, none the less, that although `perseveration' is widely recognised as a key cognitive process called upon during WCST performance, the cognitive processes underlying WCST performance remain poorly understood.
Diagnosis of schizophrenia
Whereas the WCST-insight association was stronger than the IQ-insight
association in samples of patients with psychotic disorders in general, there
was no difference between these associations when analyses were limited to
samples of patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. This was not owing to a
smaller effect size for WCST, but could be attributed to a larger effect size
for IQ in patients with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia involves more negative
symptoms and more pronounced intellectual impairment in comparison with other
psychotic disorders, and this could lead to a larger correlation between IQ
and insight; that is, a certain IQ level might be required to enable the
person to make the complex judgements involved in self-reflection and
monitoring of unusual or ambiguous experiences. Another difference between the
analysis confined to schizophrenia proper concerned the relationship between
memory performance and insight. This association was significant in
schizophrenia, but was absent when all psychoses were included in the
analysis. In schizophrenia, large effect sizes of memory impairment have been
documented (Aleman et al,
1999) and a certain level of memory function may be necessary for
intact insight.
An alternative interpretation of the different results in the analyses including schizophrenia v. `all psychoses' would be that this does not imply a specific role of perseveration in impaired insight, but rather reflects an effect of clinical diagnosis. That is, in patients with less severe psychotic disorders only executive and attentional functioning might be impaired, whereas schizophrenia is characterised by generalised cognitive impairment. Thus, a relationship with insight is found only for cognitive functions that are impaired. Direct comparison between different patient groups is needed to test this possibility. The results of a study published after our meta-analysis was completed may be consistent with this notion (Keshavan et al, 2004): in a sample of 535 patients with first-episode psychosis, the authors observed significant associations of impaired insight with multiple cognitive domains, including memory, learning and executive functions. However, another recent study of a sample comprising 122 out-patients with schizophrenia failed to find significant associations between insight and neuropsychological tests sensitive to frontal lobe function (Freudenreich et al, 2004).
Different scales
With regard to the use of different insight scales, the PANSS, SAI, SUMD
and ITAQ apparently yielded effect sizes in the same range. This is consistent
with studies that observed high correlations between these different insight
measures (Sanz et al,
1998; Cuesta et al,
2000; Drake & Lewis,
2003). Unfortunately, owing to the small number of studies
reporting separate data for different components of insight scales, it was not
possible to analyse differential relations in this regard. It has been
suggested that reduced symptom relabelling abilities might be more closely
related to deficits in cognitive functioning than other domains of insight
such as illness awareness and treatment compliance
(Morgan & David, 2004).
The latter components would be less independent of external factors such as
social and cultural variations (Saravanan
et al, 2004).
A possible explanation for the small and inconsistent correlations observed in a number of studies might be that the relationship between insight and cognitive deficits is non-linear. According to Startup (1996), both motivational and cognitive deficits affect insight, with a trade-off between the two processes, giving rise to quadratic relationships between insight and cognitive test performance. Unfortunately, the other studies included in our meta-analysis did not examine curvilinear associations.
It should be noted that the effect sizes were rather small, implying that cognitive function may explain only a limited portion of the observed variance in insight ratings. The method of meta-analysis has been criticised for mixing dissimilar studies, publication bias and inclusion of poor-quality studies. We addressed these issues by imposing strict inclusion criteria and exploring publication bias. Indeed, as Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) have noted; `criticisms of meta-analysis that are applicable are equally applicable to traditional, non-quantitative, narrative reviews of the literature'.
Future research should focus more in detail on the role of metacognitive processes, and examine separate components of the insight construct. Koren et al (2004) reported in a sample of 30 patients with first-episode schizophrenia that prediction of poor insight was significantly improved by adding the new, free-choice metacognitive measures to the conventional WCST measures. These preliminary results suggest that metacognition might be an important mediator between basic cognitive deficits and poor insight, and might be even more relevant to poor insight than cognitive deficits per se.
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