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Consciousness as a Truth-organ considered, or Contributions to Logical Psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 February 2018

W. G. Davies*
Affiliation:
Chaplain, Asylum, Abergavenny

Extract

The first class of objects to be viewed as producing a distinct order of consciousness embraces the fundamental sensation, and its attendant sensations. But perhaps it is necessary to explain before entering upon the task of analysis, that it would be foreign to the nature of Logical Psychology to enumerate, and enlarge upon the objects contained in each class of that nature. The demands of that science are fully answered when we have pointed out that a certain class of objects—though we may know little else about it—marks out a distinct variety of intellectual power. Let it be remembered then, that it is the aim of these contributions to describe—not the objects of consciousness, even when these are mental in their character—but, exclusively, the cognition of them. The following table will, it is trusted, clearly determine the boundaries of that department of psychology to which these researches are confined.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Royal College of Psychiatrists, 1860 

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References

Erratum. In the last at p. 118, for “it is not lying there unknown,” Head, “is it not lying there unknown?” Google Scholar

To prevent misapprehension, we here explain that fundamental perception is equivalent to both fundamental cognition and fundamental sensation; and that the former of these last means, the c element-the latter, the o element of the perception, thus;— Google Scholar

Sec Bains on the Senses and the Intelleat, p. 330. 7. Google Scholar

We may understand touch to include muscular discrimination, when the former term alone is used, and there U no occasion for distinguishing between them. Google Scholar

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